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Abstract  
Is the self already relational in its very bodily foundations? The question of whether 
our mental life is initially and primarily shaped by embodied dimensions of the individual or 
by interpersonal relations is debated in many fields, including psychology, philosophy, 
psychoanalysis, and more recently, cognitive neuroscience. In this interdisciplinary target 
article, we put forward the radical claim that even some of the most minimal aspects of 
selfhood, namely the feeling qualities associated with being an embodied subject, are 
fundamentally shaped by embodied interactions with other people in early infancy and 
beyond. Such embodied interactions allow the developing organism to mentalize its 
homeostatic regulation. In other words, embodied interactions contribute directly to the 
building of mental models of the infant’s physiological states, given the need to maintain 
such states within a given dynamic range despite internal or external perturbations. 
Specifically, our position rests on the following three propositions: (1) The progressive 
integration and organisation of sensory and motor signals constitutes the foundations of the 
minimal self, a process which we have linked to contemporary, computational models of 
brain function and named ‘embodied mentalization’; (2) Interactions with other people are 
motivated and constrained by the same principles that govern the ’mentalization’ of 
sensorimotor signals in the individual --and hence the mentalization of one’s body can 
include signals from other bodies in physical proximity and interaction, especially in 
interaction with particular bodies. (3) Crucially, given the dependency of humans in early 
infancy, there is a ‘homeostatically-necessary’ plethora of such embodied ‘proximal’ 
interactions, especially as regards interoception. Collectively, such experiences of proximal 
intercorporeality ‘sculpt’ the mentalization process and hence the constitution of the minimal 
self, including the progressive sophistication of mental distinctions between ‘subject-object’, 
‘self-other’ and even ‘pleasure-pain’. Finally, we explore notions of cardiac and more broadly 
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interoceptive awareness, as later, cognitive acquisitions that allow us to progressively solidify 
such distinctions, as well as understand and empathise with other people.  
 
 
1.  Introduction: Is the Self Primarily Bodily or Social?  
A child falls in the playground and mildly scrapes her knee. What is her first reaction? 
Begin to cry? Look at the knee to verify the external location and degree of the tissue damage 
she presumably feels from the inside? Both are possible. Yet, as many parents would attest to, 
frequently the first thing that children do is turn to the parent and await their reaction before 
they proceed with a proportional, behavioural reaction of their own. Developmental and 
social psychologists explain such behaviors as related to modelling (Bandura, 1967) and 
social referencing (Klinnert et al., 1986). Psychodynamic scholars may interpret such 
behaviors as identification (Hobson & Lee, 1999), ‘affect attunement’ (Stern, 1985), or affect 
regulation in the context of attachment (Bowlby, 1969, 1973). However, such behaviors raise 
a more fundamental question. Why does an experience of bodily pain, so intimately 
connected with subjectivity and an individual’s own body, invite immediate social attention 
and reaction? In this interdisciplinary target article, we put forward the radical claim that 
even some of the most minimal aspects of selfhood, namely the feeling qualities associated 
with being an embodied subject, are fundamentally shaped by embodied interactions with 
other people in early infancy and beyond. 
Many fields have examined whether our mental life is initially and primarily shaped 
by embodied dimensions of the singular individual or by interpersonal relations.  In 
psychology, philosophy, and psychoanalysis, several debates surround the question of 
whether bodily or social drives are the primary motivator of the mind, as well as the question 
of whether bodily or social experience is the primary organizer of the self (see also Ciaunica 
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& Fotopoulou, 2016). In psychoanalysis, for example, Freud sketched the development of the 
self as dependent mostly on the vicissitudes of unconscious and initially ‘objectless’ drives. 
In addition, he stressed the bodily, and predominately sensory, origins of selfhood. Object-
relations theory, by contrast, articulated by psychoanalysts such as Ronald Fairbairn and 
Melanie Klein, emphasized that the primary motivation in infancy is object seeking (social 
relating) and the primary organizer of the mind are internalized social relations. Attachment 
theory, as developed by John Bowlby (1969, 1973, 1980), expanded by developmental 
researchers such as Mary Ainsworth (et al., 1978), and integrated into developmental, 
psychodynamic theory more generally (e.g. Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist & Target, 2002), further 
contributed to the idea of a primary social drive and a socially constructed self. While 
contemporary psychoanalytic models have developed beyond these classic theories and 
several intermediate positions have been put forward (e.g. Winnicott, 1972; Stern, 1985; 
Anzieu, 1989; Beebe & Lachmann 1998; Aron & Sommer Anderson, 1998), fundamental 
disparities still exist between theories that emphasize the individual versus the social origins 
of the mind. 
In addition, one can trace a parallel ‘de-somatization’ tendency within psychoanalysis. 
Theoretical developments have progressively abandoned not only the centrality of sexuality 
and other bodily drives in mental life (e.g. see Aron, 1998; Green, 1997; Fonagy, 2008 for 
critical discussions), but most perspectives within psychoanalysis have paid progressively 
less attention to the once core idea that the mind, and particularly the self, are rooted in and 
structured by embodied and enacted experiences. As Conger has reflected, “the body has 
been invisible, for years unaddressed and ignored, left in the waiting room of the therapist’s 
office” (Conger, 1994, pp. 211). Instead, several analysts have called for emphasis on the 
symbolic, metaphorical, ‘meaning-based’ and more generally psychological, or mentalistic 
representation of bodily phenomena (e.g. Greenberg, 1991; Gill, 1994; Aron, 1998). This 
Mentalizing Homeostasis 
 
5 
 
trend can be seen even in the relation of psychoanalysis and attachment theory. For example, 
Bowlby’s theories emphasize both embodied concepts such as ‘physical proximity’ to the 
caregiver, and more cognitive notions such as ‘internal working models’ (Bretherton and 
Munholland, 1999), as key developmental ingredients of psychological growth. Yet 
attachment research and theory have since focused increasingly on mentalistic concepts such 
as ‘maternal sensitivity’ (Cassidy & Shaver, 2008), the regulation of emotional states (Slade 
2000), and eventually metacognitive concepts such as ‘mentalizing’ and ‘reflective 
functioning’, i.e. the ability to infer and understand the mental states of oneself and others 
(Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist, & Target, 2002; see also Fonagy & Target, 2007 and Shia & 
Fonagy, 2016 for critical discussions). It seems that in some respects, contemporary 
developments in psychoanalytic theory have prioritized the symbolic, reflective and narrative 
aspects of the self at the expense of its embodied nature (e.g. see Fonagy & Target, 2007; 
Conger, 1994 for critical reviews). 
Similar debates and developments can be traced in philosophy, in developmental 
psychology and more recently in cognitive neurosciences. In philosophy, for example, Zahavi 
(2014, 2015a,b) has recently presented a careful analysis of two influential, contrasting 
positions on the nature of the self. On the one hand, (embodied) experiential minimalism 
claims that our mental life is characterized by a pre-reflective sense of self or “mineness” 
which can be traced to the body, and can and should be understood without any contrasting 
others. In this view, we initially experience ourselves as a “self” because of our own 
embodied experience.  On the other hand, according to social constructivist views, the self is 
not innate, but a later socio-culturally determined acquisition, emerging in the process of 
social exchanges and narrative practices (e.g. Schechtman, 1996).  Thus, this view argues that 
there can be no sense of self without an engagement with others. 
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In developmental psychology, the question of the embodied versus the social origins 
of the self has centered on whether there is a rudimentary distinction between self and other 
in infancy (e.g. Gallagher & Meltzoff, 1996), or whether the infant and the caregiver can be 
best considered as an undifferentiated system from the point of view of the infant’s mind (e.g. 
Welsh, 2006). Several different views have been put forward on each side of this debate. 
Views that do not recognize an early self-other distinction include, for example, Piaget’s 
classic ‘cognitive’ views on the fused but egocentric infant, or Winnicott’s more affective, 
holding, mirroring and undifferentiated mother-infant dyad (see Müller et al., 2006 for 
review). By contrast, proposals for an early self-other distinction include Meltzoff’s imitating 
infant (1989) that can differentiate between self and other from infancy, and Daniel Stern’s 
(1985) clearly differentiated but ’affectively attuned’ infant.  
Furthermore, these two positions on the nature of the self-other distinction have 
implications for the understanding of the development of social cognition and self-other 
relatedness. For scholars that view the infant’s mind as socially undifferentiated (e.g. 
Merleau-Ponty, 1960), the question of ‘other minds’ is relatively straightforward, in the sense 
that the other’s mental states are not opaque, they do not require any reflective inference but 
are instead directly perceivable in their behavioral expressions. In the words of Scheler, it is 
“in the blush that we perceive shame, in the laughter joy” (Scheler, 1913/70, p. 10, emphasis 
as in original). Thus, for these scholars the critical developmental task is one of separation, 
differentiation and individuation (Mahler et al., 1973). By contrast, scholars that adhere to the 
possibility of an early, rudimentary distinction between self and other are mostly interested in 
describing how the understanding of other minds can ever be possible, as minds are seen as 
private and directly ‘unperceivable’ (Meltzoff & Moore, 2000; Morton & Frith, 1995; 
Gallese, 2005; Tomasello et al., 2005). This latter question has centered on the developmental 
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trajectory of the so-called ‘theory of mind’, or ‘mentalization’ capacity, defined as the ability 
to understand and attribute mental states to oneself and others.  
Interestingly, empirical data have not really settled these debates for or against the 
‘theory of mind’ accounts. For example, according to one view, young infants, as well as 
non-human primates, are able to ‘mind-read’ to some degree, while according to other views, 
such abilities in early infancy are best characterized as ‘behavior reading’, or ‘goal 
understanding’ (Poulin-Dubois et al., 2009). Hence, they should not be viewed as evidence in 
favor of the existence of early ‘theory of mind’ abilities. According to the latter 
interpretations, infants may ‘pass’ theory of mind tests because they are able to estimate the 
statistical likelihood that some behaviors (e.g., gaze direction) will be linked to future actions 
(e.g., reach towards a congruent location). Thus, distinguishing between mentalistic and 
expectancy violation accounts has proven rather difficult (Povinelli & Vonk, 2004). 
Similarly, the results of infant imitation experiments have generated more interpretations and 
debates than the questions they set up to answer (e.g. compare Gallagher and Meltzoff, 1996 
with Welsh, 2006). 
Moreover, recent decades show intense debates even among the proponents of the 
idea that an early distinction between self and other necessitates the development of 
‘mentalization’ abilities. For example, scholars disagree on whether understanding other 
minds is achieved by ‘simulation’ and ‘analogy’ with one’s own, first-person, embodied 
perspective (e.g. Gallese, 2005), or by cognitive inference from a third-person perspective 
(e.g. Morton & Frith, 1995). Indeed, more recently a number of intermediate positions have 
been put forward, notably interaction theory (Fuchs & De Jaegher, 2009; Gallagher, 2001, 
2004) and second-person approaches (Reddy, 2008; Schilbach et al., 2013). These emphasize 
neither the first- nor the third-person view on understanding other minds, but instead put 
forward the idea that early, reciprocal interactions and emotional engagements with 
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caregivers are fundamental to build shared ‘we-experiences’ that progressively form the basis 
of all social understanding. There are however on-going debates regarding the precise role of 
the so-called “we-experiences” or “plural self-awareness” and whether these we-experiences 
presuppose, or lead to the self-other differentiation (Reddy, 2008; Gallotti and Frith, 2013; 
Schmid 2014; Zahavi & Rochat, 2015).  
 
The self is both bodily and social: A summary of our main claim and its 
implications 
 
Our position is clearly in line with the above second-person and interaction theories 
(see also Ciaunica & Fotopoulou, 2016). Nevertheless, as we explain in detail below, we put 
forward an alternative second-person proposal that places emphasis on the fact that one of the 
main purposes of early social interactions is the regulation of the infant’s homeostasis. Thus, 
our aim is to present a rather reductionistic and mechanistic account of how embodied 
interactions lead to the constitution of minimal, affective selfhood in development and 
beyond.  To explain our position, we will start by describing briefly what we mean by a 
‘minimal affective selfhood’. Nevertheless, it should be clear by now that this target article 
cannot possibly address in full the many questions and debates on the nature of the self, 
within and across fields, nor are we aiming for a comprehensive review of the relevant 
empirical literature on the self-other distinction and the understanding of other minds. 
Instead, we aim to merely show that some of the aforementioned divisions and debates are at 
least partly fueled by the tacit over-reliance on the role of visual, proprioceptive and verbal 
modalities in the constitution of the self at the expense of other modalities such as affective 
touch, pain and interoception (in its wider, homeostatic definition, see below). We argue that 
when one reconsiders the role of these interoceptive modalities in infancy and beyond, the 
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bodily and the social origins of the self appear as tightly interwoven. In a similar vein, the 
assumption of a sharp distinction between behavior- and mind-reading becomes less 
meaningful. Indeed, we will argue that inferential processes such as ‘mentalization’ or 
‘theory of mind’ are actually advanced forms of more primitive inferential processes of 
embodied perception and action, what we will term ‘embodied mentalization’.  
Moreover, this progressive ‘mentalization’ of the body in development includes not 
only the body of the singular individual but other bodies in proximity and interaction. Thus, 
building a mind, and understanding other minds, are embodied and tightly connected 
processes. We argue that the constitution of the self is dependent upon the social 
mentalization of the body and particularly its homeostatic needs. In short, the radical aspect 
of our proposal is that social interactions do not shape only the reflective (narrative or 
extended) self and related notions of affect regulation and social cognition. Instead, the most 
minimal aspects of selfhood, namely the feeling of being an embodied, agentive subject, are 
fundamentally shaped by embodied interactions with other people in early infancy and 
beyond. Progressively these embodied interactions allow the developing organism to 
mentalize its homeostasis and hence they constitute the core of our embodied subjectivity. 
We unpack these ideas below. 
 
2. The Minimal Self: Pre-reflective, “Ego-logical” and Affective 
The question of what, if anything, provides a sense of self or makes the “self” a 
unifying phenomenon has attracted a considerable number of philosophical enquiries and 
empirical studies, the review of which lies beyond the scope of the present paper. Rather, for 
our limited purposes we note that, despite disagreements on crucial questions about the 
existence and nature of the self, several contemporary accounts share the assumption that 
selfhood is not a subjective reflection on some other mysterious substance, or structure called 
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the “self” (see also Ciaunica & Fotopoulou, 2016). Instead, both classic phenomenologists 
such as Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, and more recent scholars working within the 
embodied/enactive cognition paradigm (Varela et al. 1991; Gallagher 2000; Zahavi 2005), 
insist on the idea that the foundations of our self-awareness are bodily. According to 
Merleau-Ponty (1945) for example, the basis of our self-awareness does not involve any 
reflective, objectifying of the self, but is instead experienced as a lived sense of practical 
engagement and orientation. It is not reflexive consciousness (ideas, beliefs, knowledge) that 
constitute the world, but a body which is already of and in this world. Our embodiment brings 
to experience an a priori structure, tacitly expressed in our possibilities for action. From this 
perspective, several contemporary philosophers (Legrand, 2006; Zahavi, 2014) insist that our 
minimal self is pre-reflective, in the sense that we can be aware of our embodiment without 
needing any kind of self-oriented thought that presupposes an epistemic division between 
subject and object.  
Moreover, some phenomenological accounts suggest that pre-reflective awareness is a 
fundamentally first-personal subjective experience (Zahavi, 2006); it possesses content that 
concerns oneself (“egological”). While not all philosophers would agree with this suggestion 
(e.g. Janzen, 2007; Krueger, 2011), for some philosophers (Zahavi, 2006), this first-personal 
content is synonymous with the feeling qualities that are intrinsic to phenomenal 
consciousness, the ‘what-it-is-like’ qualities of subjectivity – the ‘what-it-is-like’ feeling of 
seeing or eating an apple, for example. This description does not imply a cognitive act of 
attributing such feelings and sensations to a distinct entity (e.g. the self) from the object of 
consciousness (e.g. a perceived apple). Rather this description implies a fundamental 
property, namely the direct giveness of such feelings and sensations as my feelings and 
sensations. Their existence as experiential states constitutes subjectivity in the same breath as 
subjectivity constitutes their existence as experiential states. As Zahavi describes it, “A 
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conscious mental state is not merely conscious of something, its object, it is simultaneously 
self-disclosing or self-revealing” (Zahavi, 2016). 
Interestingly, in his recent influential neuropsychoanalytic account of self-
consciousness, Solms (2013) seems to put forward a similar view regarding the affective core 
of subjectivity, arguing in favor of an embodied, affective consciousness which forms the 
background of all subjective, conscious experience. Solms draws a sharp distinction between 
an ‘inner mental body’, monitoring homeostatic needs and manifesting as affective 
consciousness along a pleasure-unpleasure dimension, and perceptual consciousness, which 
he links to the classic senses and the perception of the ‘outer body’, animated only via its 
connection to the inner body. In his words,   
“The internal type of consciousness consists in states rather than objects of consciousness (cf. 
Mesulam 2000). The internal body is not an object of perception unless it is externalized and 
presented to the classical senses; it is the subject of perception. It is the background state of 
being conscious. This is of paramount importance. We may picture this aspect of 
consciousness as the page upon which external perceptions are inscribed…It has recently 
been recognized that the state of the body-as-subject involves not only varying levels of 
consciousness (e.g. sleep/waking) but also varying qualities of consciousness (Panksepp 
1998, Damasio 2010). The internal aspect of consciousness ‘feels like’ something. Above all, 
the phenomenal states of the body-as-subject are experienced affectively. Affects do not 
emanate from the external sense modalities. They are states of the subject. These states are 
thought to represent the biological value of changing internal conditions (e.g. hunger, sexual 
arousal). When internal conditions favour survival and reproductive success they feel ‘good’, 
when not they feel ‘bad’. This is evidently what conscious states are for. Conscious feelings 
tell the subject how well it is doing. At this level of the brain, therefore, consciousness is 
closely tied to homeostasis”. (Solms, 2013 p. 7). 
 
Clearly, there is much more to be said about this neuropsychoanalytic perspective on 
self-consciousness, the above phenomenological insights, and the related debates in 
contemporary philosophy of mind. However, for the purposes of this paper we will restrict 
ourselves to clarifying our central claim: namely, while we broadly agree with the above 
neuropsychoanalytic and phenomenological views regarding the embodied and affective 
origins of subjectivity and selfhood, we are suggesting that at least certain parts of our 
embodied, affective subjectivity are interpersonally constituted. The important role of other 
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people in the formation of the self is acknowledged by both accounts. However, it is regarded 
as relevant to later, cognitive acquisitions of the extended, or narrative selfhood, rather than 
being constitutive of the affective core of subjectivity and minimal selfhood.  
Moreover, we should highlight that by arguing that the phenomenal quality of 
conscious states is interpersonally constituted we do not mean to imply that infants without 
caregivers would not have an affective minimal self at all and they would be in some 
unconscious ‘zombie-like’ state (see Zahavi, 2016 for criticism and the description of a 
‘thinner’ minimal self than the one discussed here). We believe that the capacity for a 
minimal, affective consciousness is prescribed by phylogenetic development, but 
nevertheless each infant’s minimal self (i.e. the particular quality of its experiential states) is 
determined in ontogenetic development. The evolutionary risk of lacking caregivers is not 
some unconscious ‘zombie-like’ state, but rather death. Hence, under the assumption that the 
mind was developed to serve the survival needs of the body, it is plausible to assume that one 
of the key features of the mind, namely its affective, experiential core, was developed to 
serve the survival needs of infants’ bodies in relation to the very people that can ensure such 
survival in ontogenesis. Against this theoretical background, we aim to argue in favor of a 
reconceptualization of minimal selfhood that traces the relational origins of the self on 
fundamental principles and regularities of the human embodied condition, which necessarily 
includes social, embodied interactions and practices in early development and beyond (see 
also Ciaunica & Fotopoulou, 2016). 
Of course, this article cannot do justice to all the possible philosophical implications 
of this position but rather based on current neuroscientific knowledge we are putting forward 
a proposal regarding the potential mechanisms that allow the minimal self to be 
interpersonally constituted. Specifically, our position is motivated by the following three 
theoretical and empirical observations: 
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(1) The progressive integration and organization of sensory and motor signals 
constitutes the foundations of the minimal self, a process which we have linked to 
contemporary, computational models of brain function and named ‘mentalization’ elsewhere 
(Fotopoulou, 2015);  
(2) Interactions with other people are motivated and constrained by the same 
principles that govern the ’mentalization’ of sensorimotor signals in the singular individual 
and hence the mentalization of one’s body can include other bodies in physical proximity and 
interaction; and 
(3) Crucially, given the premature birth, the immature motor system, and social 
dependency of humans in early infancy, there is a ‘homeostatically-necessary’ plethora of 
such embodied ‘proximal’ interactions, particularly as regards interoception and particularly 
with some bodies.  
Collectively, such experiences of proximal intercorporeality ‘sculpt’ the mentalization 
process and hence the constitution of the minimal self, including the progressive 
sophistication of mental distinctions between ‘subject-object’, ‘self-other’, and even 
‘pleasure-pain’. We unpack these points below, by focusing predominately on the domain of 
social touch, as a paradigmatic example of proximal intersubjectivity, and affective touch, as 
a paradigmatic example of shared interoception. We subsequently explore notions of cardiac 
and more broadly interoceptive awareness, as later, cognitive acquisitions. Interoceptive 
awareness allows us to progressively solidify the boundaries of the self and psychologically 
‘separate’ the self from the other, as well as ultimately ‘mentalize’ both as objects of our 
perception.   
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3. Embodied Mentalization: A Free Energy Perspective  
 
Beyond philosophical debates, and not always in agreement with all the above philosophical 
subtleties, the emphasis on a minimal, embodied self is adopted also by recent influential 
models of brain function in theoretical neuroscience (Friston, 2010; see also Clark, 2013), as 
we will consider in greater detail below. In scientific accounts, minimal selfhood can thus be 
conceived as a dynamic, ongoing process of tracking and controlling bodily properties 
(Blanke and Metzinger, 2009). This idea has been the focus of much recent, empirical 
research including investigations that use experimental ‘tricks’ to systematically manipulate 
sensorimotor and multisensory signals, promote their integration, or generate conflicts and 
illusions, and hence study their role in action, perception and body awareness (Tsakiris, 2010; 
Blanke et al., 2015 for reviews). These studies, as well as investigations in neuropsychiatry 
(see Fotopoulou, 2012a; Jenkinson & Fotopoulou, 2014; Fletcher & Fotopoulou, 2016 for 
reviews) suggest that primary multisensory and sensorimotor signals are integrated and 
organized at different levels of the neurocognitive hierarchy to form several neurocognitively 
distinct dimensions of minimal, as well as ‘extended’ selfhood (Farmer & Tsakiris, 2012; 
Fotopoulou, 2014; 2015). Related notions, for example, are the concepts of ‘body ownership’ 
(the pre-reflective sense or metacognitive judgement that bodily sensations and movements 
and the body parts upon which these are experienced are unique to one’s self) and of ‘bodily 
agency’ (the pre-reflective sense or metacognitive judgement that I am the cause of a 
movement and its consequences) (Gallagher, 2000; Legrand, 2006).  Unfortunately, due to 
space restrictions, we are not able to cover the role of motor agency in the current article and 
we have mainly focused on body ownership. 
Recently, we have independently used an influential theory from computational 
neuroscience, namely the ‘Free Energy Principle’ (FEP, Friston, 2010) to describe how the 
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integration of sensorimotor signals can be described as the ‘mentalization’ of sensorimotor 
signals (Fotopoulou, 2015; Besharati et al., 2016), and to propose a model of the multisensory 
processes that give rise to a facet of the minimal self, namely body-ownership (Apps & 
Tsakiris, 2014). These two theoretical proposals on the minimal self are important precursors 
to understanding the more radical, developmental proposal put forward in the current target 
article. We therefore, first outline the FEP framework (Friston, 2010) and subsequently these 
two theoretical proposals in turn below (see Carhart-Harris & Friston, 2010; Fotopoulou, 
2012b; Solms, 2013; Fotopoulou, 2013 for the relation between this framework and the 
Freudian metapsychology more generally). 
The starting point of the ‘FEP’ framework (Friston, 2005) is that humans are 
biological, self-organizing agents that need to occupy a limited repertoire of sensory states for 
homeostatic reasons (for example, humans need to stay within certain ranges in 
environmental temperature in order to survive). However, due to the inherent ambiguity, 
complexity and uncertainty of the signals an organism receives from the world, we risk 
finding ourselves in states for longer periods than those we could biologically sustain (e.g. in 
cold climates). We thus need to be able to predict (infer) the causes of our possible sensory 
states despite the limited or noisy information available to our sensory organs (von 
Helmholtz, 1878/1971). The framework proposes that our brain engages in a form of 
probabilistic representation of the causes (e.g. the weather) of our future states (e.g. our 
temperature) on the basis of noisy sensory data; in other terms, it maintains hypotheses 
(‘‘generative models’’) of the hidden causes of sensory input. Furthermore, it uses such input 
to constantly update its models, so as to reduce its representational errors over time and thus 
ultimately minimize the risk of ‘surprise’ (unpredictability, see below for a formal definition). 
It is precisely these embodied and inferential processes that one of us (AF) has proposed 
should be understood from the point of view of psychology as ‘embodied mentalization’ 
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(Fotopoulou, 2015). Although the term ‘mentalization’ is traditionally used in psychology to 
refer to our cognitive ability to infer the mental states of others and our own’, its alternative 
use in this context is deliberate. We purposefully use the term “mentalization” to ground this 
traditional concept in its embodied origin, and highlight that self-awareness is not some ‘add-
on’ inferential process of ‘mind-reading’, but rather a more fundamental process of 
organization and schematization of bodily signals; as such it also directly and necessarily 
extends to the mentalization of any-body (see below).  
While a full description of the free energy framework, and its mathematical and 
neurobiological implementation, goes beyond the scope of the current target article, 
consistently with the aforementioned work (Fotopoulou, 2015; Besharati et al., 2016), we 
define ‘embodied mentalization’ here as the inferential brain process by which primary 
sensorimotor and multisensory signals are progressively integrated and schematized to form 
multiple, predictive models of our embodied states in given environments. These models are 
not understood as static body representations in the brain (e.g. ‘body schema’ vs. ‘body 
image’) but rather as ‘hypothetical’ (probabilistic, inferential), dynamic and generative 
processes (they are constantly updated against received error signals). Thus, in simple terms, 
the brain is taxed by evolution to engage in constant mental ‘modelling’ of its environment 
and its own bodily states. For example, our sensory organs do not just passively perceive the 
environmental temperature, and then our brain forms mental conclusions about the weather 
conditions. Instead, our brain anticipates that certain weather conditions will influence our 
sensory organs and body temperature in a particular way, and we update our expectations 
about the weather based on the difference between the expected and the experienced body 
temperature. Thus, contrary to common sense views, our body is not there to serve our 
mind’s thoughts and desires, but rather the mind is there to serve the body’s needs in a given 
environment.      
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More specifically, the free energy framework is biologically constrained by the so-
called ‘predictive coding’ models of perception (e.g. Henson & Gagnepain, 2010; McNally et 
al., 2011). According to such models, a constant filtering of sensations by top-down 
predictions and a parallel updating of the latter based on prediction errors (signals 
representing the mismatch between predictions and sensations), with the ultimate goal of 
minimizing prediction errors, is an imperfect but highly efficient means of perceiving 
sensations (Rao and Ballard, 1999). This model assumes that our brains achieve the 
minimization of prediction errors by recurrent message passing among hierarchical level of 
cortical systems, so that various neural subsystems at different hierarchical levels minimize 
uncertainty about incoming information by generating a prediction (or a prior belief, see 
below) and responding to errors (mismatches) in the accuracy of the prediction, or prediction 
errors. Such prediction errors are passed forward to drive the units in the level above, which 
encode conditional expectations that optimize top-down predictions to explain away (reduce, 
inhibit) prediction error in the level below, until conditional expectations are optimized. Such 
message passing is considered neurobiologically plausible on the basis of functional 
asymmetries in cortical hierarchies; prediction errors are thought to be conveyed via 
feedforward connections from lower to higher levels in order to optimize representations in 
the latter. Predictions from higher-levels are also transferred via feedback connections that 
have both driving and modulatory characteristics and can suppress prediction errors in lower 
levels. This hierarchy is thus reciprocal but asymmetric and models the nonlinear generation 
of sensory input (Adams et al., 2013). Based on such hierarchical, perceptual schemes, the 
free energy principle rests upon the idea that the brain as a whole works as an Helmholtzian 
inference machine that is trying to optimize its own model of the world by actively predicting 
the causes of its sensory inputs (Friston, 2005). Moreover, in this framework, perception is 
tightly linked to action, which is defined as the inverse way to reduce free energy.  
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Specifically, while perception reduces free energy by prediction updating and 
cancelling out prediction errors, action can reduce free energy by changing sensory input. 
After all, merely representing the world (perceptual inference) cannot take us far in terms of 
our ultimate goal – surviving in an uncertain world (see above). Psychologically speaking, we 
may become better in predicting the changes in the environment that act to produce sensory 
impressions on us, but we cannot on this basis change the sensations themselves and hence 
ultimately their surprise. By contrast, by acting upon the world we can change its states and 
therefore ‘re-sample’ the world to ensure we satisfy our predictions about the sensory input 
we expect to receive. This selective sampling of sensory inputs based on expectations adds 
accuracy to our predictions about sensory states. This is known as ‘active inference’. Active 
inference can reduce free energy by changing sensory input, while perceptual inference 
reduces free-energy by changing predictions. If perception is a system for predicting reality, 
action is one for testing such predictions. In this respect, the framework is consistent with 
theories of embodied cognition and enactive perception (see Clark, 2013 for discussion) that 
stress the close link between action and perception. To return to our simplified weather 
example, if our brain anticipates that certain weather conditions will influence our body 
temperature in a particular way, one way to reduce predictions errors regarding our body 
temperature is to walk until we reach the predicted body temperature.  
At this point it is important to also acknowledge some of the mathematical 
components of the model, although as aforementioned it is not possible to do them justice in 
this interdisciplinary article, nor are we able to fully explain them for the non-specialized 
reader. We thus offer them here for pure reference and they can be skipped by the non-
interested reader. Computational neuroscientists understand the above inferential, predictive 
process in Bayesian terms (Bayes’ theorem describes an optimal procedure for updating the 
probabilities assigned to a hypothesis in the light of new evidence), in the sense that it relies 
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on a combination of prior beliefs (probability distributions over some unknown cause 
excluding any sensory data) and new sensory data to update prior beliefs and generate 
posterior beliefs (probability distributions over some unknown cause after data have been 
received).  Furthermore, in the free energy principle this hierarchical minimization of 
prediction errors is understood as a minimization of free-energy on the basis of the formal 
(i.e. mathematical) definition of the latter; a quantity from informational theory that bounds 
(is greater than) the evidence for a model of data (Hinton & van Camp, 1993). In this case the 
data is sensory and free energy bounds the negative log-evidence (surprise) inherent in 
sensory data, under a model of how the data were caused (see Friston, 2010 for the 
mathematical details). Given some mathematical assumptions, free energy can be thought of 
as the amount of prediction error in any given level of the system. Minimizing free energy 
then corresponds to explaining away prediction errors following the principles of Bayes 
(Friston, 2010). To return to our simple weather example, these mathematical, probabilistic 
notions are used to formulize how we update our expectations about the weather or fulfill 
them by action optimally, in light of new sensory evidence such as changes in our body 
temperature.   
In the context of this framework, ‘embodied mentalization’ is therefore the on-going, 
dynamic process of maintaining and updating generative models of the likely causes of 
sensory data from inside the body itself (see also section on Interoception below) and the 
external world. Progressively, as a consequence of learning, predictions become more 
encompassing and abstract, so that higher levels of cortical representation in the brain 
become able to integrate information from multiple lower levels and efficiently predict the 
causes of multisensory and sensorimotor signals. In this way, multicomponent embodied 
experiences are ultimately and hierarchically organized into coherent mental categories. 
When activated, these are consciously experienced as independent from the embodied 
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experiences that gave rise to them (as ‘things’ in themselves), and can in fact be brought to 
consciousness in a top-down fashion, i.e. irrespective of any on-line sensory experience. For 
example, the sight of a lemon is tightly and almost automatically associated with its 
distinctive sour taste, even when we are not tasting it, as though the taste resides in the lemon 
and not in the contact with our mouth’s taste buds.  Furthermore, hearing or reading the word 
‘lemon’ immediately brings to mind such properties, i.e. its yellow color, its shape, and all 
other effects a lemon typically has on our body, including some more implicit, or pre-
reflective aspects, such as how we usually grasp it, how it can be perceived and manipulated 
from different perspectives, etc.   
The same principles of progressive schematization and predictive organization apply 
to our own body, so that the various embodied experiences are organized (bound together) in 
multisensory and sensorimotor ‘wholes’ that allow us to predict the probable causes of 
experience of the various parts and functions of the physical body itself. Typically, for 
example, when we see ourselves in the mirror we have a unified and coherent experience of 
our body as standing in front of the mirror where we ‘feel’ it to be and not in the mirror space 
where it is reflected. In this sense, the physical body itself is not passively perceived but 
actively metalized. Thus, for example, by the time we are adults such ‘hypothetical’ 
(probabilistic, inferential) and generative models (they are constantly updated against 
received error signals) allow us to experience a continuity in our embodied experience 
despite potential minor changes in weight, appearance or form, and we even have a fantasy of 
how our body is perceived by other people or other visuospatial perspectives (mentalization 
of the body, Besharati et al., 2016). Thus, in brief, not only is the mentalization of the world 
and our experience in it tightly linked with our embodiment (embodied mentalization, 
Fotopoulou, 2015), but the experience of our physical body itself is progressively organized 
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and schematized in hierarchical, predictive and generative models (body mentalization, 
Besharati et al., 2016).  
 In terms of bodily self-awareness, more specifically, Apps and Tsakiris (2014) have 
used the Predictive Coding framework, described earlier, to account for at least some of the 
basic processes that govern the multisensory basis of bodily self-awareness, and extended it  
to account for its malleability. They argued that one’s body is processed in a probabilistic 
manner as the most likely to be “me” (see Limanowski & Blankenburg, 2015 for empirical 
support). Such probabilistic representations are created through the integration of top-down 
‘predictions’ about the body and of bottom-up “prediction errors” from unimodal sensory 
systems that are then explained away. The mental representation of the physical properties of 
one’s self are therefore also probabilistic. That is, one’s own body is the one which has the 
highest probability of being “me,” as other objects are probabilistically less likely to evoke 
the same sensory inputs. Interestingly, the empirical evidence from bodily illusions that probe 
the mechanisms of body-awareness suggest that multisensory integration – especially in the 
absence of motor signals – functions as a potent cue for constructing body-awareness as well 
as for altering the boundaries between self and other. To illustrate, in the Rubber Hand 
Illusion (RHI), one of the most influential experimental models of embodiment, watching a 
rubber hand being stroked synchronously with one’s own unseen hand being stroked causes 
the rubber hand to be experienced as part of one’s body (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Tsakiris, 
2010). In the RHI, visually observed touch on the skin that is temporally congruent with 
touch detected by the somatosensory system will become associated with each other, 
resulting in a prediction of a somatosensory event when contact to the skin is about to occur. 
In contrast, touch between two other non-corporeal objects will never evoke a somatosensory 
event, and thus the prior probability of a somatosensory event following touch on such 
objects is very low. So one’s own body is probabilistically likely to become and be the object 
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that touch is predicted to be experienced upon. The visual properties of different body parts 
will also be perceptually learned such that when any object approaches the body, a 
somatosensory event will be predicted. Thus, perceptual learning within the free-energy and 
predictive coding frameworks leads to generative models where aspects of one’s body are 
processed as probabilistically the most likely object (or collection of objects) that when 
touched, moved, threatened, or acted upon in any way, evokes events in the other sensory 
systems that detect the state of the body. In short, the notion that there is a “self” is the most 
parsimonious and accurate explanation for sensory inputs.   
One final aspect of the free energy framework needs to be emphasized to clarify the 
nature of the minimal self from this perspective. In the free energy framework, the challenge 
of the organism is to navigate the world by sustaining a set of prior beliefs, sufficiently robust 
that can guide action towards the world despite its changes. At the same time, our generative 
models of the world must not be so immutable that our responses become fixed, stereotypical 
and insensitive to unpredicted change. Indeed, an intrinsic component of the free energy 
framework is that our generative models need to maintain a (Bayes optimal) dynamic balance 
between their robustness and flexibility. In other words, the organism needs to know when to 
pay attention to bottom-up prediction errors and hence update its models, or act to satisfy its 
predictions, and when to ignore and suppress such errors by top-down predictions at higher 
levels. This balance between bottom-up signals and top-down expectations is achieved by 
minimizing our uncertainty (optimizing certainty) about prediction errors (between and 
within sensorimotor modalities). In psychological terms, the organism needs to optimize not 
only how it interprets sensory data, but also how it processes their reliability and salience in a 
given context. Depending on how much ‘weight’ can be attributed to certain priors or sensory 
data, the organism can control the significance it attributes to the sensory data it uses to 
update its predictions, or explain away prediction errors. For example, one may not notice 
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mild fluctuations in body temperature as environmental temperature changes on a typical 
working day, but if such fluctuations were to occur while someone is visiting a foreign 
country for the first time, they may be more sensitive and responsive to such changes.    
In Bayesian terms, organisms do not just need to probabilistically infer the states of 
the world (content:  mathematically this can be thought of as the center of a probability 
distribution), they also need to infer the uncertainty of such states (context: the dispersion of 
such distribution). Sensory signals may be more or less relevant depending on the context in 
which they are encountered. Hence, optimal inference requires optimizing the precision 
(mathematically inverse dispersion or variance, and hence the inverse of uncertainty) of 
sensory signals (Feldman & Friston, 2010; Friston et al., 2012). This is important, especially 
in hierarchical schemes, where precision controls the relative influence of bottom-up 
prediction errors and top-down predictions. Previous neuroscientific studies have linked this 
notion of ‘precision’ with neuromodulation of synaptic gain (such as the role dopamine and 
acetylcholine may have on synaptic gain, Friston, 2010).  As regards sensory data deriving 
from the world (exteroception), this salience optimization can be seen as flexible attention in 
perceptual inference (Feldman & Friston, 2010), and as affordance sensitivity (latent action 
possibilities of cues in the environment) in active inference (Friston et al., 2012). As regards 
sensations about the state of one’s own body (interoception, see also below), optimizing the 
precision of sensory prediction errors can be seen as increased interoceptive sensitivity (see 
Fotopoulou, 2013; Ainley et al., 2016) and as increased seeking behaviors in active inference 
(see Fotopoulou, 2013; Pezzulo et al., 2015). Moreover, precision operates both within and 
between modalities. At each level of the hierarchy and taking account of the given context, 
the brain weighs the relative precision of prediction errors (potentially from different 
modalities) that inform or revise (potentially multimodal) expectations at higher levels of the 
hierarchy.  
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The notion of ‘precision optimization’ turns out to be highly relevant for the 
coherence of our body awareness, despite the variable, ambiguous and conflicting sensory 
data available to our body.  For example, it has been recently shown that the RHI, the 
aforementioned test of the feeling of body ownership, as well as the so-called ‘sensory 
attenuation’ phenomena associated with feelings of motor agency can be accounted for by 
precision optimization (Brown et al., 2013; Zeller et al., 2014). In the RHI for instance, the 
brain attenuates the precision of ascending, proprioceptive prediction errors about the actual 
position of the participant’s own arm (Zeller et al., 2014) in order to accept the more 
plausible (even if illusory) perceptual hypothesis that it is one’s own body that receives 
synchronous tactile and visual information, rather than the alternative hypothesis that another 
body evokes tactile sensations. One could therefore hypothesize that the ability of an 
organism to optimize the precision of its predictive errors may be crucial for both the 
robustness and malleability of its psychological self in relation to the world and particularly 
other people.   
While we cannot do justice to these proposals and models and their many applications 
in this article, in the subsequent sections, we expand these insights into the mentalization of 
the body and the probabilistic, inferential model of the self to include fundamental 
developmental considerations regarding (1) the role of proximal interaction in the 
mentalization of the body and the minimal self; (2) the role of interoception and particularly 
affective touch in the mentalization of the body and the minimal self and lastly, (3) the role of 
action and ‘active inference’ (an important aspect of the Free Energy principle; see section 7) 
in the mentalization of the body and the minimal self.  
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4. The Touched Self: Multisensory Integration of Other Bodies and Embodied 
Mentalization 
In this section we describe how interactions with other people are motivated and constrained 
by the same principles that govern the ’mentalization’ of sensorimotor signals in the 
individual, and hence the mentalization of one’s body can include signals from other bodies 
in physical proximity and interaction. As mentioned in the introduction, questions regarding 
minimal selfhood and the self-other distinction have received increasing empirical attention 
in developmental psychology over the past few decades. Some researchers have focused on 
multisensory integration and ‘contingency detection’ paradigms (Gergely & Watson, 1999 
for review). The idea in these paradigms is to examine whether infants can distinguish 
between sensory changes arising from, and hence congruently with, their own motor actions 
(self) and sensory changes arising from the environment independent of their own action 
(non-self).  For instance, some studies have now illustrated that infants as young as 3-5 
months show sensitivity to body-related, proprioceptive-visual synchrony and, as motor 
control develops, also spatial congruency (Rochat & Morgan, 1995). In such paradigms, 
infants tend to respond differentially to visual feedback of their body parts moving 
synchronously and in spatial congruency to their own movements, rather than manipulated 
visual feedback that is asynchronous or spatially incongruent. These studies thus suggest that 
infants behave differently towards sensations that originate from their own body versus those 
that are caused by the environment. 
Importantly, in these paradigms the critical variables that allows for this rudimentary 
self-other distinction are not modality specific. For example, the visual information of the 
body in the above infant experiments is the same between conditions. What differs is the 
‘amodal’ property of temporal synchrony or spatial congruency between proprioceptive 
information (where infants felt the body to be) and visual information (where the infants saw 
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the body to be). In simple terms, in the above experiment, it seems that infants can tell that 
what they see (via the visual modality) in front of them is similar or different from their own 
movements (detected via the proprioceptive modality). It seems therefore that such amodal 
‘contingency-detection’ abilities are existent from early on and hence infants may be able to 
track the co-occurrence of sensory events across modalities. They may thus be able to 
progressively build predictions about the kind of sensorimotor signals that are most likely to 
occur together in relation to their embodiment. As we described in relation to the free energy 
model above, this may be the main building block of the self. Hence, the infants’ ability can 
be seen as evidence for an early, rudimentary self-other distinction.  
Indeed, this is in fact the basis of most multisensory integration paradigms in adults: 
sensitivity to synchrony (the so called ‘glue of the senses’) across sensory modalities allows 
perceiving subjects to experience unitary multimodal events and to ascribe their origin on 
one’s own body or the external world. Accordingly, developmental studies on sensitivity to 
cross-modal synchrony have been considered as evidence for the early ability for a 
rudimentary distinction between self and other. In the preceding section, we described this 
progressive organization of perceptual input into distinct, unitary multimodal schemata as a 
process of ‘embodied mentalization’ and placed it in the context of a computational model of 
brain functioning (see Section 3 above). We are, in other terms, arguing that infants’ early 
ability to bind together sensory information in time and space lies at the core of a process of 
progressive mentalization of their embodied experience and hence at the core of the minimal 
self (even if rudimentary at this stage).  
To this point, we have referred to the mentalization of the body as a process that 
concerns only the singular individual and its body. However, this analysis misses an 
important dimension of the mentalization process as it unfolds in development; namely, in 
early development caregivers’ bodies provide sensory data that can be plausibly experienced 
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by infants as their own. Put crudely, the bodies of human caregivers provide an almost 
continuous embodied engagement in infancy, during which rich patterns of synchronicity and 
other forms of sensory and spatial contingency and congruency are frequently enacted. These 
seem to be reinforced by a rich repertoire of biological and cultural practices of interaction 
(e.g. hugging, kissing, singing, clapping, stroking, rocking, holding), as well as necessary and 
frequent routines of embodied engagements required to satisfy infant’s basic biological and 
psychological needs (e.g. breastfeeding, washing, rubbing-cleaning, skin-to-skin sleeping, 
body-to-body temperature regulation and skin hydration, toileting; see also following 
sections). Extensive research has recently focused on ‘visual’ signals from other bodies, 
under ‘mirroring’ assumptions and theories of different kinds (see Gallese, 2013 for review). 
However, we propose here that the early, crucial role of such embodied practices in the 
formation of the minimal self is most obvious when one considers the special case of 
interpersonal ‘touch’ and the infant’s immature motor system (see also next sections).  
Indeed, there is even some evidence that fundamental feelings of body ownership 
develop based on early visuo-tactile integration mechanisms, before later processes of visuo-
proprioceptive integration (Cowie et al., 2013). For example, a recent experimental study 
found that newborns look preferentially at visual face stimuli being touched in synchrony 
with their own face and were able to discriminate visuo-tactile synchrony from visual-tactile 
asynchrony (Filippetti et al., 2013).  In this instance, the tactile stimuli in question were not 
caused by the infant (as her own movements on the above experiments). Instead, they were 
caused by another individual ‘matching’ the visual feedback for the purposes of the 
experiment. We propose that during proximal, caregiving interactions in early infancy, 
caregivers offer naturalistic ‘matching’ between their bodies and those of their infants. For 
example, a mother and a father may giggle playfully while tickling their baby. Tickling and 
giggling may thus be bound together as a frequent experience of the infant’s body. More 
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generally, we are proposing that what determines the early mentalization of one’s own body, 
as opposed to that of another individual (i.e. which sensory input will be bound together and 
attributed to the self as most likely source of such input), may be somewhat paradoxically 
caused by embodied, social interactions. In other terms, embodied interactions between an 
infant and a caregiver may promote both self-other fusion (e.g. during moments of absolute 
synchrony, congruency or affective attunement) and self-other distinction (during inevitable 
moments of asynchrony, incongruency and non-attunement).  
In everyday life, feeding, sleeping, calming down or entertaining routines typically 
include endless repetitions of multisensory bundles from at least two bodies (e.g. active and 
passive touch, proprioceptive and vestibular information, smell, temperature, visual and 
auditory feedback). During such experiences, the infant is therefore learning and responding 
to regularities and irregularities between the various sensorimotor ‘bundles’ of his and the 
caregivers body. As the baby learns to bind together ‘own body’ sensations from 
proprioception and vision regarding the position of her own limbs for example, she may also 
bind together sensations from proprioception, interpersonal touch and the smell of her father. 
Thus, the mentalization of the body, i.e. the progressive build-up of multisensory predictions 
in perceptual inference, includes the body of the primary caregivers. In this sense, the very 
first-person experience of my body as mine, as well as the building block of the self-other 
distinction, are constituted upon the presence of other bodies in proximity and interaction.  
Before we go on, however, to further explain why physical contact and interpersonal 
touch has a unique, primary role in the minimal self, it is necessary to stress that, contrary to 
social constructivism (e.g. the idea that infants develop a mind because their caregivers have 
their mind in mind; see introduction), the critical social variable emphasized here is ‘other 
interacting bodies’, rather than other minds with higher order mental states. We support of 
course the idea that the presence and behavior of caregivers is determined by their feelings 
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and intentions towards infants, and these mental states (and the caregivers’ psychological 
traits more generally) are of great importance for the degree of availability and exact behavior 
of caregivers (see also Section 8 below). However, the constitutive factors of minimal 
selfhood we are trying to account for in this section concern the mere embodied presence of 
caregivers and some minimal caregiving activity towards infants. For example, while the 
presence and behavior of a mentally absent, versus a highly responsive caregiver would be 
different and may have different effects on the infants’ personality and of course their 
mentalizing, we argue here that infants would develop a minimal self of some quality 
regardless of such differences.  
Let us illustrate the above point in reference to a common experience in parenting, 
paired with recent empirical study on infant holding. Most parents would recognize the fact 
that it is far easier to calm a crying baby while standing up and pacing in the room with the 
baby in one’s arms, rather than by holding the baby in one’s arms while seated. In agreement 
with this, a recent study in infants less than six months old found that being held and carried 
by a walking mother led the infants to immediately stop voluntary movement and crying and 
exhibit a rapid heart rate decrease, compared with holding by a sitting mother (Esposito et al., 
2013). Furthermore, similar motor, vocal and heartrate ‘calming’ responses were observed in 
mouse pups, supporting the idea of a conserved embodied component of mammalian mother-
infant interaction. We assume that the mental states and ‘mindreading’ capacities of mothers 
towards their babies do not typically vary depending on whether they are walking or sitting, 
and yet it appears that the particular bodily behavior of the caregiver (pacing versus sitting) 
seems to have direct behavioral and physiological effects on infants.  We thus suggest that 
these findings demonstrate the importance of embodied caregiver-infant interactions per se 
(e.g. mobile versus static holding), without the need to refer to the sharing of any higher 
order, mental, or even spatial, concepts such as intentionality, empathy or perspective. In 
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short, embodied interactions with caregivers may have a fundamental role in shaping the 
mentalization of one’s own body, even prior to the more complex psychological 
considerations and exchanges between infant and caregiver such as those described by classic 
mentalization and theory of mind accounts (see introduction).   
Similar effects of embodied and primarily tactile interactions between parents and 
their offspring have long been established in other mammals (Harlow & Zimmerman, 1958; 
Panksepp, 1998). For example, in primates, pro-social tactile stimulation (i.e. licking and 
grooming) attenuates responses to stress, with beneficial long-term effects (Korosi and 
Baram, 2010; Weaver et al., 2004) and activates endogenous analgesic processes mediated by 
opioid (Kehoe & Blass, 1986) and oxytocinergic mechanisms (Agren et al., 1995). The 
involvement of these neurobiological pathways, implicated in stress and pain regulation (e.g., 
Lundeberg et al., 1994), as well as the formation and maintenance of close social bonds 
(Insel, 2000; Nelson and Panksepp, 1998) provides some indirect support for the idea that 
social touch is critical for the development of the affective nucleus of the self. This idea is 
also supported by clinical and developmental studies suggesting that touch-based 
interventions such as massage and ‘skin-to-skin’ contact can have positive psychological and 
physical effects in preterm infants and children (Feldman and Eidelman, 2003; Field et al., 
2010 for a review) and in adult illness (e.g. Hart et al., 2001). Unfortunately, such studies 
have methodological limitations and relevant systematic research in human infants is sparse 
and mostly correlational (e.g. Sharp et al., 2012). 
Moreover, for the most part, scholars of human infancy, including some 
psychoanalysts, tend to claim that such effects in humans are mediated by parents’ mental 
states and related, higher-order psychological concepts (e.g. theory of mind, attachment style, 
etc.). Even in theories that have stressed embodied aspects of infant-caregiver relationship, 
e.g. ‘affect attunements’ (Stern, 1985), "contingency detection module," (Gergely & Watson, 
Mentalizing Homeostasis 
 
31 
 
1999) or ‘marked mirroring’ (Fonagy et al., 2002), these are rather quickly embedded in more 
complex mentalistic conceptualisations about the caregiver’s mind. For instance, there is the 
assumption that infants’ minds are first ‘read out’ by the mothers and then responded to 
accordingly (Fonagy et al., 2002), or alternatively, the infant’s ability to distinguish itself 
from others, precedes the influence of such attunements on the self (Stern, 1985).  
While we do not deny the role of such forms of relatedness and intersubjectivity, we 
agree with philosophers such as Zahavi (2015a) and neuropsychoanalysts like Mark Solms 
(2013) that such factors are secondary to the mechanisms responsible for the minimal self 
(see also Ciaunica & Fotopoulou, 2016). Nevertheless, we propose that proximal embodied 
interactions of caregiving (as opposed to more higher-order, mentalistic exchanges) 
contribute to the constitution of the self from the onset, so that the primary feelings of 
‘selfhood’, or ‘mineness,’ that accompany all subjectivity are deeply rooted in social 
interactions. We further specify below why such embodied interactions are especially 
relevant and necessary for the formation of minimal selfhood, particularly as regards how 
interoception is mentalized by mechanisms of multisensory and sensorimotor integration 
(perceptual and active inference in the terminology of the free energy framework).   
 
5. The Felt Self: The Mentalization of Interoceptive Signals  
What kind of bodily signals become ‘mentalized’ to form the basis of minimal 
selfhood?  Although it has long been proposed that bodily self-awareness relies on an 
integrated representation of multiple streams of sensory and motor information as described 
above, there has been a strong bias in the kind of bodily signals studied. Specifically, most 
scientific investigations have focused on ‘multisensory integration’ paradigms that study the 
integration of exteroceptive (e.g. vision, audition, touch) signals, or on sensorimotor 
integration paradigms that may also include motor, efferent signals and proprioceptive or 
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vestibular feedback. Remarkably, however, until recently little work on bodily self-awareness 
concerned interoception.  
According to a recent reclassification of the senses, interoception refers to the 
perception of the physiological condition of the body, involving modalities such as 
temperature, itch, pain, cardiac signals, respiration, hunger, thirst, pleasure from sensual 
touch, and other bodily feelings relating to homeostasis (Craig, 2010; Critchley et al, 2004). It 
is distinct from the exteroceptive system, which refers to the classical sensory modalities for 
perceiving the external environment (e.g. vision, audition), as well as proprioceptive, 
vestibular and kinesthetic input informing about the movement and location of the body in 
space (Blanke & Metzinger, 2009; Craig, 2010; Critchley et al, 2004). Crucially, contrary to 
classic views of interoception as ‘the perception of the body from within’, the current notion 
of interoception is tightly linked to homeostasis; interoceptive signals are considered crucial 
in informing the organism regarding the homeostatic state of the body in relationship to 
experiences originating from within the organism (e.g. cardiac and respiratory functions, 
digestion, hunger, thirst), or outside it (e.g. taste, smell, affective touch, pain).  One might say 
that interoception informs the body about how the body itself is doing in relation to certain 
inherited, homeostatic needs (e.g. one may be dehydrated, or stung by an insect), while 
exteroception informs the body about environmental changes in relation to such needs (there 
is a river ahead) but independently of the physiological state of the body itself. Moreover, 
interoception is thought to rely on separate specialized neuroanatomical systems that are 
associated with the autonomic nervous system, special spinal cord pathways and subcortical 
and cortical brain areas mapping homeostatic and motivational states (Critchley et al., 2004; 
Damasio, 1994; Panksepp, 1998). Moreover, recent work has suggested that interoception is 
uniquely related to the generation of subjective feelings, informing the organism regarding its 
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levels of arousal and bodily needs (Craig, 2009; Seth, 2013). As such, the impact of 
interoception is thought to extend beyond homeostatic (and allostatic) regulation. 
Interoception has been ascribed a central role at the heart of self-awareness (Craig, 
2009; Critchley et al, 2004; Damasio 1994). In relation to the free energy framework, it has 
been recently proposed that subjective feeling states arise from predictive inferences on the 
causes of interoceptive signals (Seth et al, 2012; Seth, 2013; Barrett & Simmons, 2015; 
Pezzulo et al., 2015). These ‘‘interoceptive predictive coding’’ models are compatible with 
the so-called James-Lange theory of emotions which links feelings with the perceptions of 
physiological changes. Classic debates in psychology have unfolded about whether bottom-
up, direct bodily signals and/or top-down cognitive evaluations of physiological changes are 
responsible for feeling states. The advantage of interoceptive predictive coding models is that 
they can specify the dynamic balance between bottom-up interoceptive predictions errors and 
top-down cognitive signals, exactly as explained with regards to exteroception and 
proprioception. The disadvantage of interoceptive theories is that they may be missing other, 
more fundamental aspects of emotional consciousness that may relate to the optimization of 
precision in both perception and action (see Fotopoulou, 2013), or the optimization of the free 
energy itself (Joffilys & Coricelli, 2013). Unfortunately, this aspect of the model escapes the 
scope of the current article.  
Importantly for the present purposes, there is also associated, preliminary evidence 
that interoception can uniquely shape the bodily self, as studied in multisensory integration 
paradigms and neuropsychiatric disorders (see Barrett & Simmons, 2015; Seth, 2013; 
Tsakiris, 2016 for reviews). For example, participants with lower abilities to detect their own 
heartbeat seem more susceptible to bodily illusions of synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation 
(Tsakiris, Tajadura-Jimenez & Costantini, 2011; Tajadura-Jimenez & Tsakiris, 2014).  
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How can one reconcile this view with more classic considerations of the constitution 
of the minimal self and related debates on intersubjectivity as outlined above? At first sight, 
the potential role of interoception in the minimal self may be interpreted as evidence in favor 
of the idea that the sense of self primarily arises from the individual’s experience of his or her 
own body. The resulting inner feelings of ‘arousal’, ‘wakefulness’, ‘wellness’, or lack 
thereof, combined with exteroceptive and motor signals regarding the body, could thus be 
fully sufficient to form the basis of subjectivity and the self, and a fundamental source of 
information regarding the self-other distinction. This is indeed the view that several scientists 
have put forward recently (Craig, 2009; Damasio, 1994; Critchley et al., 2004; Seth et al., 
2012).   
Upon closer inspection however, it appears that interpersonal interactions are 
necessary in shaping the mentalization of interoception, and not the other way around. This 
claim is supported by two main observations, one in relation to perceptual inference and the 
other in relation to active inference. We will unpack these observations in the following two 
sections, respectively. Firstly, interoception itself derives from the outside and other bodies as 
much as from the inside of the body. Secondly and perhaps most importantly, in early 
infancy, when the motor system is not yet developed, interoceptive function and homeostasis 
are wholly dependent on embodied interactions with other bodies.  
 
6. The Affectively Touched Self: Learning Bodily Pleasure and Pain in Social 
Perceptual Inference     
As aforementioned, contrary to classic views on interoception, contemporary accounts 
define it as the set of modalities informing the organism regarding the homeostatic state of 
the body, both in relationship to experiences originating from within the organism (e.g. 
cardiac awareness, hunger), or outside it (e.g. taste, smell, affective touch, pain). In this 
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article, we will focus on affective touch, as a key example of how proximal, embodied 
interactions affect the minimal self.  
Recent neurophysiological, neuroimaging and behavioural studies suggest that certain 
tactile experiences, such as gentle caress-like strokes, are processed by at least two separate 
neurocognitive systems. First, as it has been known for decades, tactile stimuli are processed 
in terms of their exteroceptive, discriminatory processes in classical peripheral pathways and 
somatosensory cortical areas. Second, it was recently demonstrated that a specialized 
peripheral and central system codes for the affective properties of the same tactile stimulus 
(Löken, Wessberg, Morrison, McGlone, & Olausson, 2009). Whereas purely sensory touch is 
conveyed by skin mechanoreceptors projecting to the thalamus and primary somatosensory 
cortex, the neurophysiological system for affective touch (Vallbo, Olausson, & Wessberg, 
1999) seem to rely on a distinct subgroup of mechanoreceptors: tactile C-fibres (CT), 
responding only to slow (between 1-10 cm/s), caress-like touch and leading to subjective 
pleasantness (Löken et al., 2009). Crucially, CT afferents take a distinct ascending pathway 
from the periphery to a different part of the thalamus and then to the posterior insular cortex 
(Morrison et al., 2011). According to some researchers, the latter pathway mediates an early 
convergence of sensory and affective signals about the body, which are then re-represented in 
the mid- and anterior insula, the proposed sites of interoceptive awareness (Craig, 2009; 
Critchley et al., 2004).  
Thus, while gentle, stroking-like touch originates from outside the body, it appears to 
simultaneously convey information about the ‘inner’ body (e.g. reductions in physiological 
arousal) and the external world (e.g., ‘sensation of skin stimulation of some density and 
softness characteristics, slow speed and little friction). Moreover, the CT-system has been 
found to respond optimally to touch of human temperature rather than colder robot-based 
touch (Ackerley et al., 2014). This and related findings (for review and the so-called ‘social 
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touch’ hypothesis see Morrison, Loken, & Olausson, 2010) suggests that this system may be 
specialized not only for processing affective touch, but also specifically social affective 
touch. Crucially, a recent study found that nine month old infants are sensitive to the 
particular physical properties of affective touch: CT-optimal but not non-optimal velocities of 
tactile stimulation led to heart rate decelerations in the infants, possibly reflecting relaxation 
and increases in their behavioral engagement (gaze shifts and duration of looks) with the 
stroking stimulus (Fairhurst et al., 2014). Thus, this type of affective, social touch may be 
another example of a specific, embodied social behavior that can regulate homeostasis and 
influence the basic, feeling states of the infant.  
Moreover, we need to highlight here that, as aforementioned, any instance of such 
gentle, slow touch (a slow, gentle caress by a mother) simultaneously activates pathways (the 
CT system) relating to interoception and the physiological state of the body (e.g. reductions 
of physiological arousal), as well as some features of the external stimulus touching the infant 
(e.g. via fast conducting, myelinated fibers). We thus speculate that given that these 
interoceptive and exteroceptive data generated by a single tactile stimulus occur by necessity 
at the same time and place (thus they are characterized by the amodal properties of temporal 
and spatial congruency that bind modalities together and create predictions and generative 
models of their causes), they are progressively mentalized as one experience. In other terms, 
the caregiver’s touch contributes directly to the integration of the infant’s interoceptive and 
exteroceptive bodily experiences, possibly helping the infant experience the skin as the 
boundary between her body and external world. Thus, social touch, an essential part of early 
mother-infant interactions, may have a unique developmental role in progressively 
establishing the physical boundaries of the psychological self.  
Unfortunately, to our knowledge, no systematic, developmental studies have focused 
specifically on the role of affective touch in the formation of the minimal self. However, the 
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aforementioned application of multisensory integration paradigms to the study of infant body 
perception (e.g. Filippetti et al., 2013) suggests that the specific, developmental role of 
affective, social touch should be studied experimentally in early infancy and childhood. 
Moreover, indirect confirmation can be found in studies on neurodevelopment in low birth 
weight infants (see Gallace & Spence, 2010 for review). For example, Weiss and colleagues 
(2004) observed that infants of mothers who used more stimulating touch during feeding at 3 
months had better visual-motor skills and more advanced gross motor development. Other 
evidence has shown that skin-to-skin contact following Caesarean section may help maintain 
temperature of newborns and reducing new-born stress (for review, Stevens, Schmied, Burns, 
& Dahlen, 2014). Studies with older infants have showed that the infant’s arousal can be 
regulated by soothing, touch-based behaviors by their caregivers, in addition to self-soothing 
behaviors (e.g. thump sucking) (Beebe & Lachmann 1998; Rothbart, Ziaie, & O'Boyle, 
1992). Taken together these findings suggest that there are a set of embodied interactions 
between infants and caregivers, such as gentle touch of the skin, that have direct effects on 
the infant’s physiological arousal. In this sense, certain interpersonal interactions seem 
capable to ‘bind’ together inner feelings about the state of the body with external perceptions 
of the body and the world. 
In addition, indirect confirmation of our suggestion comes from studies on adults. 
Affective touch has been shown to provide information about the emotions and thoughts of 
other individuals, i.e. the touch providers (Hertenstein, Keltner, App, Bulleit, & Jaskolka, 
2006) and the touch receivers (Gentsch, Panagiotopoulou & Fotopoulou, 2015). More 
specifically as regards to the minimal self, a series of recent studies focused on the role of 
affective touch in the sense of body ownership. Using the RHI paradigm, three independent 
studies (the first of these being from AF’s lab), have now found that slow, caress-like touch 
of CT-optimal velocities and properties enhanced various subjective and behavioural 
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measures of the RHI more than fast, emotionally-neutral touch (Crucianelli et al., 2013; 
Lloyd et al, 2013; van Straleen et al., 2014). That is, affective, pleasant touch delivered by 
another individual appears to be a strong determinant in the process of multisensory 
integration that determines how a body part is subjectively experienced as mine. In keeping 
with this observation, several studies on patients with clinical disorders of the minimal self, 
such as body ownership disturbances, demonstrate that affective touch increases a sense of 
body owernshipownernshp, such as patients who at least momentarily accept their disowned 
arm as theirs following affective touch (see Gentsch et al., 2016 for review).    
The effects of embodied interactions such as affective touch on the minimal self can 
be drawn in relation to pain, including cutaneous noxious stimulation generated from the 
outside. Indeed, affective touch and cutaneous pain are two sub-modalities of interoception 
with contrasting affective qualities (pleasant/unpleasant) and social meanings (care/harm). In 
experimental studies, it is well established that social support can modulate psychological and 
neurophysiological response to pain, in adults and in children (see Decety & Fotopoulou, 
2015; Krahé et al., 2013, for reviews). Moreover, in experimental and neuroimaging studies 
with adults, we (AF’s lab) have shown that this pain modulation depends on particular 
‘embodied’ social support variables (e.g., the presence of another individual, affective touch 
by another individual), as well as individual differences in the perception of social 
relationships themselves, namely attachment styles (Hurter et al., 2014; Krahé et al., 2015; 
Sambo et al., 2013; Krahé et al., 2016). Insecure attachment styles in particular (characterised 
by negative expectations of social support), which may be linked with an impoverished 
oxytocin system (see Uvnäs-Moberg, Handlin, & Petersson, 2014), seem to moderate the 
relation between social support and pain (see also Meredith, 2013). Higher attachment 
anxiety (associated with seeking and craving signs of reassurance) led to reduced pain in the 
presence of a high vs. low empathic stranger (Sambo et al., 2013) and to reduced pain when 
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receiving CT-optimal, affective touch (Krahé et al., 2016), while higher attachment 
avoidance (associated with distancing from others and preferring to cope alone) led to 
increased pain in the presence of a stranger (Sambo et al., 2013) or one’s romantic partner 
(Krahé et al., 2015) and when receiving affective touch (Krahé et al., 2016).  
Thus, in adulthood, it appears that embodied social interactions strongly influence our 
experience of bodily pain, subject to our predictive models about the availability and support 
of others (operationalised in the above studies as attachment models, presumably built during 
childhood). We have proposed elsewhere (Decety & Fotopoulou, 2015; Krahé et al., 2013) 
that from the perspective of the free energy model, this modulation may be conceptualised as 
a modulation of the precision (salience) of nociceptive signals in a social context. In other 
words, our perception of pain, and of bodily threat more generally, may vary not only 
according to how much tissue damage is communicated by nociceptive, peripheral pathways, 
but also according to how much social support we predict is available to us in a given 
situation, or more generally.  If we are inclined by prior experiences to trust others and their 
potential active help during bodily threat, we may experience and react to pain-related 
prediction errors differently than when we are not trusting the availability or effectiveness of 
others’ support. These results seem to provide an answer to the question we raised in the 
beginning of this article regarding the paradoxical observation that an experience of bodily 
harm in childhood invites immediate social attention and reaction. The experience of pain, so 
intimately connected with subjectivity and an individual’s own body, may actually be shaped 
by interpersonal attention and other social factors.  
 Taken together, the studies reviewed in this section suggest that even the subjective 
feelings of pleasure and pain regarding one’s own body, which we may conventionally think 
of as being purely arising from within ourselves, are actually formed in interaction with other 
bodies and minds in development and in adulthood. We accept, of course, that evolution has 
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equipped humans with specialised systems for bodily pleasure and pain, as means to ensuring 
homeostasis (see also Solms, 2013). However, we are suggesting that in the developmental 
transition (both phylogenetic and ontogenetic) from physiological reaction (e.g. nociception) 
to subjective affect (e.g. pain), these modalities have been progressively ‘mentalized’ to form 
predictive, psychological feelings and action tendencies (e.g. pain-related expressions) that 
carry with them the stamp of proximal interpersonal interactions. As we discussed in Sections 
two and three, these very feelings are considered as the core of our minimal self. Thus, it 
appears that the core of selfhood is interpersonally constituted.  
 
7. When the Motor System is Not Yet Developed: Active Interoceptive Inference via the 
Other’s Body  
The above assertions on the affective core of the minimal self require an additional 
consideration. In this section, we put forward the radical claim that because human infants are 
born without a fully matured motor system, and hence they cannot regulate their own 
homeostasis unaided, the actions of their caregivers necessarily determine how they come to 
experience the affective core of their embodied selfhood. As we described above, in the free 
energy framework, action is understood as the reverse process of perceptual inference: we 
selectively sample the sensory inputs that we expect (i.e. by fulfilling proprioceptive 
predictions) in order to add accuracy to our predictions about sensory states (Friston, 2010).  
However, as in the case of perceptual inference, the conceptualization of active 
inference can be enriched by fundamental developmental considerations. Specifically, action 
and perception do not mature at the same time and this imbalance has particular implications 
for the mentalization of interoception. Given an infant’s immature motor system, what kind 
of models can she form based on active inference and sensorimotor integration? Young 
infants have at their disposal a number of reflexes, including autonomic ones, and they show 
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some movement of the head, including the face and eyes, the limbs and the trunk. Thus, for 
example, when infants open their eyes, or turn their heads, they can progressively learn to 
perceive changes in lighting. Similarly, reflective and purposeful hand or leg movements may 
frequently be met with some obstacle in the world, e.g. a blanket, a toy that makes sounds, 
etc., that is exteroceptively perceived. These first unaided sensorimotor experiences afford 
several opportunities to the infant to progressively build generative models regarding the 
possible causes of their sensory states in the external world. For instance, an infant can learn 
that closing her eyes or looking away causes changes in her visual input, which she can then 
learn to implement when large changes in environmental light occur. However, infants lack 
strength and control in their large antigravity muscles and are helpless in supporting their 
own weight, and are of course unable to initiate and execute, complex sequences of 
purposeful movements. Therefore, a young infant cannot position and balance itself, feed 
itself, thermoregulate, or protect itself from tissue damage (e.g. skin burns, bone fractures 
etc.).  
Thus, in the case of such interoceptive modalities, no movement on the part of the 
infant alone, can change certain key neurophysiological states relating to homeostasis. In 
terms of the free energy principle (see Pezzulo et al., 2015 for a detailed consideration of the 
relation between active inference, homeostatic and allostatic regulation), as far as these 
interoceptive modalities go, there can only be minimal implementation of interoceptive 
predictions by simple autonomic or motor reflexes (e.g. sucking the breast, or the bottle, 
sweating, or shivering). Put in simple terms, the infant can suck a dummy, or their fingers to 
regulate some of their neurophysiological states, but in order to eventually change states 
related to food intake and hence eventually build generative models regarding hunger and 
satiation, someone else needs to be in proximity and interaction and to offer the breast or the 
bottle. Similar considerations apply for noxious stimulation, thermoregulation and other 
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domains of interoception. Thus, the unaided infant cannot use action to collect evidence 
about the causes of its interoceptive experiences and thus it cannot test its interoceptive 
predictions against the world. 
Instead, the infant’s autonomic and motor reflexes in response to unpredicted 
physiological states (e.g. crying and kicking when hypothalamic function detect that glucose 
level are not within the predicted viable range) can elicit the attention of the caregiver and 
ensure that the caregiver tries to change the physiological state of the infant (for example by 
feeding it) until the homeostatic needs are met (i.e. glucose levels are within the predicted 
range). Thus, updating interoceptive predictions in infants includes information regarding the 
reaction of caregivers to infants’ initial autonomic and proprioceptive predictions. Therefore, 
it is the adult’s actions and reactions, their frequency and multisensory characteristics that 
will generate changes in interoceptive states and hence ultimately contribute to the 
‘mentalization’ of physiological states in the infant. Accordingly, in this section, we put 
forward the radical claim that it is exactly because a human infant depends on the caregiver to 
regulate her homeostasis that the interaction with the other is woven into the very emergence 
of the self.  In the terminology of the Free Energy model, the origins of interoceptive active 
inference are always, by necessity social, and thus core subjective feelings such as hunger 
and satiation, pain and relief, cold or warmth have actually social origins.  
Moreover, in good-enough caregiving environments, such caregiving behaviors are 
met, not only by facial expressions and other “mentally” attuned responses, but – and 
crucially – with a variety of proximal, embodied responses, such as soothing touch, holding, 
feeding, dressing etc., which, as we described above, can themselves produce further changes 
in the infant’s physiology (e.g. heart-rate reductions). Basic caregiving behaviors therefore do 
not only ‘re-sample’ the world on behalf of the infant’s interoceptive predictions, they are at 
the same time the source of multisensory input (e.g. auditory, tactile, olfactory, and visual 
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bundles of experience) and amodal properties such as rhythm, frequency, synchrony and 
other such variables (see also Stern’s vitality affects, 1985). Other bodies and their actions 
therefore stand right in the midst of all embodied mentalization processes (the formation of 
generative models based on perceptual and active inference) of the infant.  
It follows that the progressive mentalization of the affective core of selfhood does not 
take place by processes that belong to the singular infant, as certain theories assume (e.g. 
Damasio 2010; Craig 2009; Solms, 2013; Seth et al., 2012; Seth & Friston, 2016). Instead, 
active and perceptual interoceptive inference in development is by necessity mediated by the 
actions of caregivers that bring about physiological changes, and hence shape the perception 
of bodily satisfaction, relief, pleasure, pain, or lack thereof.  
Freud had wrongly assumed that the human infant’s survival needs is the ultimate 
motivation for our early social-relating. Seminal studies have since established that humans 
have an innate social attachment drive, unrelated to hunger or thermoregulation, and a 
corresponding lifelong need for social connection (Bowlby 1969; Harlow & Zimmerman 
1958; Panksepp 1998). Contrary however to the recent emphasis on mentalistic concepts such 
as ‘attachment styles,’ it is useful to remember that earlier proponents of this view indeed 
emphasized the embodied rather than the mentalistic dimensions of this drive, such as the 
‘need for physical proximity’ (Bowlby, 1969) and 'contact comfort' (Harlow & Zimmerman, 
1958). Indeed, we believe that the primacy of our social attachment drive should not obscure 
the important, embodied role of caregivers in regulating the infant’s interoceptive states and 
in turn, the foundations of the minimal self. The drive to stay close to caregivers may be an 
important inherited prior. Separation from caregivers therefore may elicit physiological 
reactions to infants that can be satisfied only by embodied, proximal interactions like the ones 
we described in this and previous sections. Thus, we are suggesting that the origins of all 
mentalization processes are not only embodied but also by necessity involve other people’s 
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bodies, their physical presence, proximity, contact and most importantly, their 
homeostatically-relevant action.  
Of course, the above conclusions regarding the embodied and social origins of our 
self-awareness do not mean to deny the importance of later, more higher-order and ‘mindful’ 
interactions between children and their caregivers. We just propose that these are 
psychological and social extensions of more fundamental, biologically prescribed processes 
of embodied care in early infancy. Thus, we briefly trace the progressive development of the 
self and the self-other distinction in the final section below. 
 
8. The Maturation, Individuation, and Strengthening of the Self: Interoceptive 
Awareness and Social Cognition 
The Development of Interoceptive Awareness. In development, as ongoing 
intersubjective bodily interactions with the caregiver get more complex, children build 
increasingly more sophisticated models of their own interoceptive states, as well as strategies 
for minimizing free energy in the interoceptive systems. This constitutes a capacity for 
awareness of interoceptive states, which seems to play a fundamental role in mental health. 
Indeed, the concept of interoceptive awareness has recently become central to 
interdisciplinary research on self-awareness.  
Interoceptive awareness reflects our ability to become aware of internal states, and is 
typically operationalized in psychophysiological research by measures of “interoceptive 
accuracy” (IAcc), such as, for example, one’s ability to accurately feel and count heartbeats 
during short intervals  (Schandry, 1981),or to detect the degree of synchronicity between 
individual heartbeats and auditory tones (Brener, Liu & Rign, 1993).  Similar methods have 
been applied in other interoceptive systems, such as respiratory or gastric sensitivity. IAcc is 
considered a trait-like proxy for interoceptive awareness (Garfinkel, Seth, Barrett, Suzuki, & 
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Critchley, 2015); inter-individual differences in performance allow us to distinguish between 
people with higher vs. lower levels of IAcc. Individual differences in cardiac IAcc have been 
linked to mental health (Herbert & Pollatos, 2012), with very high IAcc predisposing to 
anxiety, while symptom severity in patients with alexithymia is inversely related to IAcc. 
Low IAcc is also associated with depersonalisation, personality disorders, psychosomatic 
complaints, and eating disorders (Pollatos et al., 2008). In healthy adults, research into IAcc 
has been almost exclusively concerned with emotion, and is associated with the intensity of 
emotional experience and emotion regulation (Critchley & Nagai, 2012). For example, 
individuals with high IAcc are more able to self-regulate (Herbert & Pollatos, 2012) and tend 
to follow their intuition more in decision-making tasks (Dunn et al., 2010). In sum, the 
available evidence suggests that interoceptive awareness is important for emotional 
awareness and mental well-being.  
Interoceptive functions supporting homeostasis, such as vagal tone, have been 
extensively investigated in young children. For example, as with adults, vagal tone (VT) is 
linked to children’s ability to regulate arousal and similarly underlies individual differences 
in emotion-regulation and temperament. The first months post-partum are characterized by 
relative instability of key cardiovascular variables such as heart rate variability (HRV) and 
VT, which become moderately stable by the end of the first year (Fox, Schmidt, Henderson, 
& Marshall, 2007), due to physiological maturation (Fracasso, Porges, Lamb, & Rosenberg, 
1994). Importantly, their levels depend on the quality of caregiving they receive (McLaughlin 
et al., 2015), such as parent-infant contingency during interaction (Feldman, Magori-Cohen, 
Galili, Singer, & Louzoun, 2011; Feldman, 2007), and are predictive of self-regulation 
abilities in three-year-old children (Fracasso et al., 1994). Attachment style has been shown 
to shape infants’ response to stress and environmental challenges and, as with adults, studies 
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have replicated the importance of high VT for children’s emotional regulation and well-being 
(Hill-Soderlund et al, 2008).  
As we argued earlier, during embodied interactions, the multisensory input that the 
carer provides to the infant not only facilitates the perceptual inferences needed for the 
infant’s body-ownership, but also provides the means by which the infant can learn to 
identify/become aware of her distinct internal needs. There is no reason to assume that the 
infant has a clear awareness of differentiated interoceptive states from the outset – neither 
does the parent. Moreover, given the infant’s limited behavioural repertoire, it rests upon the 
carer to firstly respond as consistently as possible with her instinctual behaviour to the 
infant’s embodied expression (e.g. crying) and eventually learn to detect the precise 
interoceptive need that her multisensory embodied interactions with the infant should aim to 
settle (e.g. learn at which times crying is more likely to be associated with hunger rather than 
thermoregulation needs). Contingent, appropriate, “good enough” (Winnicot, 1972) responses 
by caregiver to the interoceptive needs will enable the infant as well as the carer to generate 
more accurate models of interoceptive inferences that, we propose, will eventually lead to 
higher interoceptive awareness. However, given the lack of empirical data on the 
development of interoceptive awareness during the first few years of life, our hypothesis 
remain to be directly tested in longitudinal developmental studies.  
From synchrony to separation. In this target article we have also argued that 
interoception and in particular the mentalization of interoceptive signals play a critical role in 
self-other boundaries. The distinction between self and other, which is crucial for self-
awareness, is equally essential for awareness of other people, as the brain must monitor 
whether sensations, events, and mental states should be attributed to oneself or not. Correctly 
identifying the origin of bodily and mental states is necessary for social relatedness. For 
example, how can I share the pain of another individual without forgetting it is not my pain? 
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The process by which models that enable us to mentalise our body are built up have clear 
implications for our understanding of the dynamics of self-other boundaries, and of their 
dependence on multisensory, sensorimotor and interoceptive signals.   
Multisensory signals have been extensively studied in the context of body-ownership 
as we described earlier. Recent experimental studies have extended the basic mechanism of 
multisensory synchronous input that was typically used to elicit changes in body-ownership 
to study self-other boundaries. For example, in the enfacement illusion (see Tsakiris, 2016 for 
a review), watching another person’s face being touched synchronously with one’s own face 
evokes changes in self-face recognition, so that we perceive the other person’s face as more 
similar to our own:  participants perceived the other’s face as physically more similar to their 
own (Sforza et al., 2010; Tajadura-Jimenez, Grehl & Tsakiris, 2012; Tsakiris, 2008); rated 
the other as conceptually closer to themselves, and also ascribed more self-like personality 
traits to the other (Paladino, Mazzurega, Pavani and Schubert, 2010); and displayed increased 
emotion recognition of the other’s emotional facial expressions (Maister, Tsiakkas & 
Tsakiris, 2013). These findings show how multisensory signals may blur self-other 
boundaries.  
Therefore, from a predictive coding point of view, perceptual inferences of the kind 
described in the multisensory literature and bodily illusions (and in the absence of agentic 
motor actions) may provide the basis for bodily self-awareness (see RHI), but at the same 
time may also create the conditions for blurring the boundaries between the self and other 
(see the enfacement illusion). Paradoxically, therefore, the early carer-infant interactions that 
rely largely on multisensory synchrony and contingency provide the basis upon which the 
infant starts building a representation of its own body that is largely shared with the other. 
Psychoanalytic insights are particularly relevant here for understanding the transition from 
the blurring between self and other towards a self-other distinction essential for the 
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consolidation of second person perspective. Indeed, responsiveness and mirroring are never 
perfect ; they are ‘good enough (Winnicot, 1972) and ‘marked’ (Fonagy et al., 2002). 
Marking, frustrations, incongruencies and inhibitions in intersubjective interactions 
progressively strengthen the self-other distinction, as psychoanalysis has long pioneered.  
Importantly, as we have argued throughout this paper, as one’s body is not simply 
perceived from the outside (i.e. exteroceptively, as when we look at the mirror) - it is also felt 
from the inside (i.e. interoceptively, as when one feels her racing heart) – interoceptive 
signals and their awareness may play an important role in self-other boundaries. In this 
regard, Tsakiris et al. (2011) observed a negative correlation between levels of interoceptive 
awareness and the changes in the experience of body-ownership (see RHI) and self-
identification (see Enfacement Illusion). People with lower levels of interoceptive awareness 
showed a stronger change in body-ownership following exteroeceptive stimulation, 
suggesting that, in the absence of accurate interoceptive representations, one’s model of self 
is predominantly exteroceptive (see also Schauder et al., 2015). The less sensitive one is to 
internal states, the more influence external stimulation appears to have.  Interestingly, lower 
levels of interoceptive awareness were correlated with greater self-other blurring during the 
enfacement illusion (Tajadura-Jimenez et al., 2012; Tajadura-Jimenez & Tsakiris, 2014). In 
the context of the predictive models of self-processing described earlier, such findings 
highlight that perceptual inferences resulting from multisensory perception update self-
representations by blurring self-other boundaries, especially when interoceptive awareness is 
low.  
What would then be the role of greater interoceptive awareness in facilitating clear 
self-other boundaries? Within a predictive coding account, the active, rather than purely 
perceptual, inferences may play a key role as they would more accurately predict sensory 
states. Past literature from experimental psychology has aptly highlighted the critical role that 
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motor voluntary actions and our sense of agency over them play for self-other distinction. 
The sense of agency is a fundamental dimension of embodied experience that describes not 
simply the experience of having a body but also of controlling one’s body in order to cause 
desired effects in the environment (Haggard & Tsakiris, 2009). There are two reasons why 
interoceptive awareness may play a vital role in the sense of agency. First and foremost, 
biological organisms depend on homeostasis, and many voluntary actions have the specific 
aim of ensuring homeostasis (e.g. looking for food when hungry). As such, the action system 
and its experiential dimension (i.e. agency) should have clear input links from the 
interoceptive system. Second, our actions produce exteroceptive effects in the world but they 
also have interoceptive consequences. Ainley, Sel and Tsakiris (under review) tested this 
hypothesis by examining the relation between levels of interoceptive awareness and a well-
established measure of agency, namely the “intentional binding” effect. In intentional 
binding, the perceived time-awareness of voluntary actions and their effects are perceptually 
attracted, so that actions and effects are perceived to occur closer together in time than they 
actually do (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002). Ainley and Tsakiris showed that 
participants with higher levels of interoceptive awareness showed a larger intentional binding 
(that reflects a stronger sense of agency). Therefore, our experience of agency, critical for 
self-other distinction, may also depend on the role that interoception plays in delineating the 
self (Craig, 2010; Damasio, 2010; Seth, 2013), in line with the view that active inference 
increases the accuracy of our predictions about sensory states that may be the result of our 
own or other’s actions and bodily states.  
 
Interoceptive Awareness and Social cognition. Lastly, the correct identification of the origin 
of bodily and mental states is necessary not just for self-other distinction but also for social 
relatedness and cognition. Emotional contagion, mimicry, body resonance, perspective-
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taking, and theory of mind have become key topics in the prolific field of social cognitive 
neuroscience and have been used to operationalize different facets of empathy, which is one 
of the hallmarks of social relatedness (Bernhardt & Singer, 2012; Decety, 2011). An 
important unresolved issue is the question of “self-other” overlap (Preston & Hofelich, 2012). 
Simply put, “self-other” overlap is thought to arise when an observer engages in an 
isomorphic state (e.g. the same emotion) to the person observed. To what degree can we 
distinguish between self and other at the very time that we are trying to understand each 
other? 
  Interoception may have a unique dual role in this respect. As we outlined in previous 
sections, its origins are social. Yet, as children develop interoceptive awareness of their own 
body as an object of their perception through interactions with the other, interoceptive 
awareness also acts as a constituting element of the self that safeguards against excessive 
self-other blurring. This view paves the way for a radically new approach to the question of 
self-other relatedness. According to recent models of social cognition, the default modus 
operandi of the social brain is to represent one’s own self (e.g. one’s own perspective, 
emotion, beliefs etc.). Switching from self to other to achieve a partial co-representation of 
self and other is therefore an effortful process that, at least to some extent, requires the 
attenuation of self-representations (Bird & Vidding, 2014). In psychoanalytic terms, one 
needs to inhibit the original self-other blurring that constituted the self in order to be able to 
focus on the other as an independent, separate object of perception. From the interoceptive 
point of view, the hypothesized attenuation of self-representations so that the other is better 
represented would need to be extended to interoceptive feelings. According to this view, 
lower levels of interoceptive awareness may provide an advantage in switching from self to 
other because the attenuation of interoceptive prediction errors may be computationally 
easier. Consider the case of emotion contagion, where exposure to someone else’s emotion 
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brings about a similar affective state in the perceiver but without explicit awareness that the 
catalyst for the state should be attributed to the other individual. A lack of awareness of the 
origin of the affective state may indicate low IAcc. An alternative hypothesis that we put 
forward holds that understanding others requires a ‘good enough’ representation of one’s own 
(interoceptive) states, because our representation of the other’s states is based on an 
awareness of how their states affect us (on the basis of how they affected us originally).  
Moreover, this self-representation should now display sufficient stability to prevent 
the blurring of self and other. Such blurring may indeed happen in adulthood, particularly in 
certain moments of emotional turmoil, which may arise in attempt to maintain either bodily 
integrity or attachment, and thus may be more common in some psychopathologies such as 
borderline personality disorder (Fonagy et al., 2002), or neuropathologies such as 
somatoparaphrenia (Fotopoulou et al., 2011). In the case of empathy, which, unlike emotion 
contagion, requires explicit knowledge of the origin of the emotion (Bird & Vidding, 2015), 
it is as yet empirically untested whether one needs an accurate sense of one’s own body, in 
order to emphasize with the other, as a separate individual.  
 
9. Conclusion  
Building mainly on empirical research on affective touch, pain and interoceptive awareness, 
we have argued in favour of a reconceptualization of minimal selfhood that stresses that the 
fundamental principles of the human embodied condition determine both the embodied and 
the relational origins of the self. Specifically, we have described as ‘embodied mentalization’ 
the process of building generative models by detecting regularities and irregularities in 
modality-specific and “amodal” properties, such as synchrony, and organizing sensory input 
of both personal and interpersonal origins into distinct, unitary multimodal schemata 
(perceptual inference). We have also stressed that such models refer not only to exteroception 
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but also to interoception, the senses that inform the organism regarding the homeostatic state 
of the body. Furthermore, the mentalization of the body involves not only perceptual 
integration and subsequent inferences, but also action and thus sensorimotor integration 
(active inference). Accordingly, we have made the radical claim that in early infancy when 
the motor system is immature, proximal interactions are necessary for the active 
mentalization of interoceptive states and therefore the corresponding core aspects of the 
minimal self. There is therefore a continuity between the minimal and the interactive, social 
self.  
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